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Middle East Roadmap To Peace? 

Table of Contents

The Roadmap  
Israeli/Palestinian Arab Conflict A Regional Issue 
Terrorism Pays According To President Bush 
Bush Administration exacerbates the problem 
A Palestinian State Will Not Result In Peace
An Analysis of the Roadmap 
Timeline
Phase I Outset 
June 2003-December 2003-Phase II 
2004-2005 - Phase III
End Notes

In the next several weeks the American Voice Institute of Public Policy will begin an in depth study of the attempt to resolve the Israeli/ Palestinian Arab conflict by President George W. Bush.  The term peace process began to be widely used to describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors sometimes in the mid-1970s.  (1) Ever since the phrase struck and has been synonymous to resolving one of the world's most difficult conflicts with the gradual, step-by step approach. 

In a territory of ambiguous boundaries the Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs each claim rights in regards to its national homeland.  This local conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs since 1948 has been transformed  into a regional conflict between  Israel and the Arab states, with generally playing a passive role of victim more than agents is the Palestinian people. (2) 

The 1967 Six Day War set the stage for the contemporary Arab-Israeli peace process. (3)  Until  this war, the conflict between the Arabs had seemed almost static, moving neither towards resolution nor towards war. (Ibid)  Furthermore, the Six Day War ended the Arabs belief that Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser could end their sense of weakness and humiliation at the hands of the West.  (4)  Nasser sought to unify the ranks of the Arab world by using his most potent weapons Arab nationalism and the demand for the restoration of Palestinian rights. 

After the Six Day War Nasser prestige was shattered although he lived for another three years after the war.  The Arab nationalism the type that Nasser preached would never again would never be such a powerful force.  Instead regimes instead started to look more and more after their own narrow interests.  Following suite, was the Palestinians who organized their own political movement free of control of any Arab government.  A new generation of Palestinian emerged after the Six Day War.  To keep the Palestinians under control, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was originally supported by Arab regimes but quickly developed into an independent entity.  Among Arab regimes this caused much concern because they were not used to seeking Palestinians take matters into their own control. (5) 

The Roadmap  

The initial discussion of this series will begin with the current attempt by the Bush Administration to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by proposing a performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to this conflict.  Unfortunately, Israel is being pressured into concessions that undermine its long-term security by agreeing to accept the Roadmap and Washington should remember that Israel is the only democracy in the region and is a close ally that brings stability to the regions against the tyrannical dictatorships that surround it.  For example, should Israel refuse to comply with the plan for a Palestinian state by the end of the year the Bush Administration has prepared a list of sanctions against Israel.  (6)  Amid the Administration's effort to press Israel to agree to the so-called Roadmap U.S. government and congressional sources said the list was prepared by the State Department and relayed to the National Security Council In April. (Ibid) An end to the Israeli-Palestinian war and the establishment of an interim state in 2003 is called for by the Roadmap, drafted by Washington as well as the European Union, United Nations (UN) and Russia (the Quartet) . (7) 

The State Department's proposed list of sanctions included an examination of the use of United States (U.S.) weapons in the West Bank and Gaza Strip said the sources.(8) 

A congressional source close to the Administration said, " It's hard to overestimate the anger within the Administration toward Israel regarding the delays in the Roadmap.  The White House doesn't regard the Roadmap merely as foreign policy.  It sees the Roadmap as a major element toward the reelection of the president." (9) 

The Israeli acceptance of the Roadmap has suspended any action on the list of proposed sanctions said the source. (10) However, should Israel fail to implement the Roadmap over the next few months they did not rule out that the Administration would reconsider. (11) 

Arms shipment to the Jewish state could be suspended with the State Department threat to examine the Israeli use of U.S. weaponry.  The AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter has been ordered by Israel and scheduled to arrive later this year is the first F-16I jets. (12) 

The suspension of $9 billion in U.S. emergency aid was included in other proposed measures against Israel drafted by the State Department. (Ibid) Eight billion in loan guarantees and $1 billion in a military grant comprises the aid. (13) 

The money would have been held up on grounds that Israel has not implemented economic reform demanded by the U.S. said the sources. (14) 

President Bush has pledged to Arab allies that he will continue to remain involved in the implementation of the Roadmap said the source. (15) Also, the President pledged that the Palestinian state will emerge by the end of the year they said. (16) 

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Israeli/Palestinian Arab Conflict A Regional Issue 

The Israeli/ Palestinian Arab conflict is not a conflict of the U.S. or the Quartet. Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat utilizing the media as his tool has made a regional conflict into an international issue by portraying the Palestinians as victims of the Israeli aggressors. 

By using the Roadmap as their vehicle the U.S./Quartet is trying to impose an agreement on either side.  However, history serves to prove this approach as being flawed.   The reason for this if either the Palestinians or the Israelis feel that the process is unfair they will at the first opportunity defect the process.  Previous U.S. Administrations have tried this approach and it has failed. 

President Bush should encourage the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs to negotiate with each other not with Washington or the Quartet and should minimize its role as well as the Quartet in the peace process.  The reason for this is that direct U.S. involvement was not responsible for some of the biggest breakthroughs in peace negotiations.  For example, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem.  The two sides must be allowed to work out their disputes to the greatest extent possible by the Bush Administration and when both sides request it suggest ways to break diplomatic impasses.  The U.S. or collectively as the Quartet cannot impose a lasting Palestinian Arab/ Israeli peace and this must be negotiated pain stakingly by the parties to the conflict. 

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Terrorism Pays According To President Bush 

President Bush set-forth his (Bush) doctrine for America's war on terrorism in his speech before a joint session on Congress on September 20, 2001.  The president said that 

[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.  From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the U.S. as a hostile regime. (17) 

The President asked the civilized world to stand with the U.S. against terrorism.  Yet in the case of Israel the President practices double standards on terrorism and does not give unqualified support to Israel who has been besieged almost daily since September 2000. 

Israel is not being allowed to defeat terrorists who seek its destruction by the Bush Administration as was the case with the Clinton Administration.  When the Administration threatens Israel with sanctions if it blocks the Roadmap the President underscores this point.   

The ambitions of Syria, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) will neither be appeased nor contained by such actions.  Tragically, the only thing this does is convey the message that when unleashed against Israel terrorism does work.

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Bush Administration exacerbates the problem 

Once again the President Bush as well as the State Department demonstrate that they still do not have a clear understanding and grasp of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  They wrongly believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about Palestinian nationalism and the creation of a Palestinian state.  Such a proposal was turned down by the Arabs in 1937, 1947 and once again by Yasser Arafat in 2000. 

The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in 1947, adopted Resolution 181 (II), which recommended partitioning Palestine into two-states-one Jewish and one Arab as they realized that the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine could not live together in one state. 

However, claiming that all of Palestine belonged to them the Arabs rejected this plan while the Jews accepted it.  In an attempt to prevent its creation all of the Arab states attacked Israel when it declared its independence in 1948. 

The Bush Administration treats as moral equivalents both Israel its long time ally and only democracy in the region and PA that have been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against Israeli and American citizens in its obsession to advance the peace process. 

The primary obstacle to peace is not Israel but continued Palestinian terrorism.  Israel should remain reluctant to rush into a new agreement that will entail considerable Israeli concessions of land in return for unreliable Palestinian promises of security cooperation given the long failed record of Palestinian violations of past agreements. 

Palestinian terrorism, not Israel’s understandable reluctance to surrender more territory that could be used to launch terrorist attacks is the chief obstacle to stable Israeli-Palestinian peace.    

Only if the PA complies fully with its past agreement can a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be reached. 

Every time the two sides reach a negotiating impasse the Bush Administration should resist the temptation to leap into diplomatic action.  As the parties become increasingly dependent on American intervention this ultimately retards the negotiating progress. 

The U.S. cannot impose a solution between these to groups but must assist them to reach a durable agreement. 

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A Palestinian State Will Not Result In Peace 

Unfortunately, as history has demonstrated when the U.S. puts a plan on the table to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict the process does not achieve the desired objectives and goals.  Only when it does not publicly set-forth a plan but conducts quiet contacts between both parties has the U.S. helped achieve progress between Israel and the Arabs.  Wrongly the U.S. and collectively with the Quartet is rewarding  the PA for terrorist attacks on Israel. 

The Bush Administration must realize that the formation of a Palestinian state would not be in the best interest of the U.S. and this was demonstrated by former Israel liaison to the U.S. Congress Yoram Ettinger.  He writes, “The PLO’s track record suggests that a PLO state would have bolstered Saddam [ever] since 1990; aligned itself with Iran; doomed Jordan during the 1970 Syrian invasion, threatened Kuwait and other Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms; become prime training ground for international terrorists; provided Russia and China with another Mideast platform; been the most corrupt and oppressive regime in the region; and utilized its initial territory as a spring board to establish a neo-terrorist state from Iraq to the Mediterranean .”  (18) 

The  promotion of the Roadmap by President Bush will be viewed as a success for  terrorism by Islamic fundamentalist’s.  

Both President Bush and Secretary Powell have been told that producing advancement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would greatly deflate anti-American sentiments in their populations by several Arab leaders. (19) 

Some have said that even without movement on negotiations, the American effort could help shore up the coalition because the U.S. will get credit for trying. 

U.S. peace initiatives have always failed in the region and to impose such a plan on Israel would produce similar results. 

The U.S. will never be able to buy the goodwill of the Arab masses and it is a mistake to attempt to appease Arab countries.  In the Arab world anti-American sentiments have been for years in rife. 

In PA-controlled areas Palestinian demonstrators have burned American flags and supported Saudi militant Osama bin Laden and the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.  So one can easily see that it would be a  big mistake to establish a Palestinian state. 

A bloody battle against the PLO and its Chairman Yasser Arafat were waged by the late Jordanian King Hussein in 1970.  The King was ousted from the Heshemite kingdom a year later. 

Helping to foment that country’s civil war several years later Arafat and PLO located in Lebanon.  Thousands of Lebanese civilians had been killed, “tortured to death and maimed by the PLO by the time Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 forced Arafat to flee the country. 

When the U.S. is fighting a worldwide battle against terrorism why would it want to add  another nation state that supports terrorism. 

Prior to 1991, the State Department pushed for the abandonment of tough sanctions against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, opposed a war against him and before it was finished launched a successful bid to stopping it.  Also, it lobbied for the courting of radical Islamic leader Ayatollah Khameni and the deposing of the Shah of Iran.    Furthermore, when Secretary Powell was chairman of the joints chief of staff he also supported finishing the Gulf War early that allowed Hussein to remain in power and has ever since been a thorn in America’s side until his regime was toppled by operation Iraqi freedom.  So one can easily see that the State Department should rethink its involvement  in the peace negotiation in the Israeli-Arab conflict because their previous track record is less than stellar. 

Israel is responsible for the safety of its citizens just like the U.S. is and must accordingly act to protect its people.  President Bush should rethink his position because the U.S. cannot force nor ask Israel to accept  a plan that would make possible and legitimize the creation of a new terrorist-sponsoring regime, all in the vain hope that in doing so will somehow help the U.S. fight international terrorism. 

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An Analysis of the Roadmap 

Roadmap (20)  

1.  What is the Roadmap? 

A performance-based permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

2.  Who developed this solution? 

Four powers known as "the Quartet," the U.S., European Union (EU), Russia and the UN. 

3.  What is the goal of the Roadmap? 

          A final and comprehensive settlement by 2005 of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. 

4.  How will this be achieved? 

a. Through an end to violence and terrorism.

b. When the Palestinian leadership will decisively act against terror and when a practicing democracy is developed based on tolerance and liberty.

c. Through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established.

d. A clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below.

e. The plan will be facilitated and assisted by the Quartet.  This will begin with Phase I, including direct discussion between the parties as required. 

5.  Who determines if the Roadmap is being followed and if the objectives are
      
successfully being implemented? 

To evaluate the parties' performance and implementation of the plan, the Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels unless otherwise indicated.  The parties are expected to perform their obligation in parallel in each phase. 

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Timeline 

Present to May 2003-Phase I 

Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions 

1. According to steps outlined below, the Palestinians immediately undertake an        unconditional cessation of violence in Phase I.   As a result of this, supportive
 
  measures undertaken by Israel should accompany. 

2.  Security cooperation between Israeli and Palestinians will resume based on the
     
Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured      and effective Palestinian security services.  

3. In preparation for statehood, Palestinians will undertake comprehensive political 
    
reform that includes:  

        a.  Draft a Palestinian constitution and 

        b. Free, fair and open elections upon the basis of these measures. 

4.  To help normalize Palestinian life, Israel will take all necessary steps that include: 

a.  From Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 200, Israel withdraws.

 b. According to the status quo that existed at that time, the two sides restore as cooperation and performance progress; and

c.  Consistent with the Mitchell report, Israel also freezes all settlement activity. 

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Phase I Outset
 

I.  Palestinian Leadership 

a.  Issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security. 

b.  Calls for an immediate and unconditional cease fire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. 

c.  Ends Incitement against Israel by all official Palestinian institutions. 

II.  Israeli Leadership 

a.  Issues unequivocal statement affirming commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace and security as expressed by President Bush. 

b. Calls for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. 

c.  Ends Incitement against Palestinians by all official Israeli institutions. 

III.  Security 

Palestinians 

1.  Declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism; and

2. Undertake on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups     conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.

3. Rebuild and refocus a security apparatus beginning with sustained, targeted, and effective operating aimed at confronting all those engaged in terms and     dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure.  This includes: 

a. Commencing illegal weapons confiscation

b. Consolidation of security authorizing free association with terror

 Government of Israel (GOI) 

 1.  Takes no action undermining trust that includes: 

a. Deportation;

b.  Attack on civilians;

c. Confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; 

d. Destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and 

e. Other measures specified in the Tenet work plan. 

Quartet 

1. Representatives, relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources start informal monitoring and consult with the parties and the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation. 

2. As previously agreed, implementation of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with an outside oversight board (U.S.- Egypt-Jordan).  For efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire the Quartet will support the following:

a.  All Palestinian Security organizations consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister

b.  Palestinian security forces restructured/retrained  and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan that include regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.

c.  For groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror, Arab states cease public and private funding and all other forms of support.

d.  The Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account of all donors providing budgetary support

e.  The IDF will withdraw progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, as comprehensive security performance moves forward and the two sides will restore the status quo that  existed prior to September 28, 2000.

f. Areas vacated by the IDF Palestinian will be redeployed by security forces.

Palestinian Institution Building 

1.       Immediate action is taken on a credible process to produce a draft constitution for Palestinian statehood.

2.  A draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and a cabinet with an empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate is circulated as rapidly as possible by the constitutional committee.

3.  After elections, for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions, the constitutional committee proposes a draft document for submission. 

4.      Appointment of an interim prime minister with empowered executive authority/decision-making body

5.  GOI  fully facilities travel of Palestinian officials for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and Cabinet sessions, in internationally supervised security, electoral and other reform activity and other supportive measures elected to the reform efforts.

6.  Undertaking fundamental reform with continued appointment of empowered       Palestinian ministers.  To achieve genuine separation of powers, including any       necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose, completion of further steps.

7.  Establishment of an independent Palestinian election commission.  Election law is reviewed and revised by the PLC.

8.  As established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks.

9.  Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections as early as possible, that are based upon the measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process.

10.  GOI facilitates:

a. Movement of candidates and voting officials, registration of voters, and Task Force election assistance. 

b.      And support for Non-Governmental Organizations NGOs involved in the election process.

 11.  Based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce is reopened as well as other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. 

Humanitarian Response 

  1. Israel will take measures to improve the humanitarian.   All recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions will be implemented in full by Israel and the Palestinians that include: 

        a  Lifting curfews,

        b.  Easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and

c.  Allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian  personnel.

2.  In the West bank and Gaza, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development and a major donor assistance effort, including launching the reform effort.

3.  In accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism, the GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and the transfer of funds, including arrears.

Civil Society

1. Israel will take measures to improve the humanitarian.   All recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions will be implemented in full by Israel and the Palestinians that include: 

2. For people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives continued donor support, including increased funding through  Private, Voluntary Organizations (PVOs)/NGOs

Settlements 

1. For people to people programs, private sector development and civil society    initiatives continued donor support, including increased funding through  Private,      Voluntary Organizations (PVOs)/NGOs

2. Settlement outposts erected since March 2001, GOI must immediately dismantle. 

3. The GOI must freeze all settlement activity including natural growth of settlements      consistent with the Mitchell Report.  

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June 2003-December 2003-Phase II 

1.  Based on the new constitution, as a way station to permanent status settlement,      efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with      provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty. 

2.  When the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror      willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, this     goal can be achieved. 

3.  The Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader       international community in establishing an independent, viable, state with such a       leadership, reformed civil institutions, and security structures.  

4.  Upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet will determine whether conditions are appropriate  to proceed to progress into Phase II. The start of Phase II is after Palestinian elections and  ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003 furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions.  

5.  Its primary goals are:

a.      Continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation,

b.   Continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution building,

c.    Further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I,

d.    Ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution,

e.    Formal establishment of office of the prime minister,

f.     Consolidation of political reform, and

g.    The creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. 

International Conference

 1.  Immediately after the successful conclusion of the Palestinian elections to support  Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process leading to the establishment of  an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders, a conference will be      convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties.

2. Such a meeting would be inclusive

 a. Based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon) and

 b. Based on the principles described in the preamble of this document.     

 3.  Pre-intifada links are restored to Israel by Arab states (trade offices, etc.)

 4. On issues including regional water resources, environment, economic        development, refugees, and arms control issues revival of multilateral        engagement.  

5.   Finalized and approved by the appropriate Palestinian institutions is a new constitution for a democratic, and independent Palestinian state.  If required,       further elections should follow approval of the new constitution.

6.  Consistent with the draft constitution, an empowered reformed cabinet with the office of prime minister formally established.

7.  On the bases set forth in Phase I, continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation.

8.      Through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the International conference, creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

9.  Implementation of prior agreement, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity,   including further action on settlements in conjunction, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional orders, as part of this process.

10.  In monitoring transition, with the active sustained, and operational support of the Quartet an enhanced international role.

 11.  Promotion of the international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible  UN membership by the Quartet members.

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2004-2005 - Phase III

Permanent Status Agreement And End Of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

1.  Based on the consensus judgement of the Quartet and taking into account actions of both parties and the Quartet monitoring progress into Phase III.  Objectives of Phase III are:

a.  Consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions,

b. Sustained, effective Palestinian security performances, and

c.  Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.       

Second International Conference

 1.  To endorse the agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, the conference will be convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at the beginning of 2004.  Included in the discussion at this conference will be:

a.   Borders,

b.  Jerusalem,

c.  Refugees,

d.  Settlements, and

e. To support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.

2.  In preparation for the final status agreement, continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force.

3.  On the bases set forth in Phase I continued sustained and effective security      performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation.

4.  In preparation for the final status, agreement, international efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutional and the Palestinian economy.

5.      Through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the      occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic       solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security the parties reach a final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005.

6.  For all the states of the region in the context of  a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security.

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End Notes

  1. William B. Quandt; Peace Process. American Diplomacy And The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967; Brookings Institution/University of California Press  2001.
  2. Noam Chomsky, Middle East Illusions, Rowman & Littlefield; 2003.
  3. William B. Quandt; Peace Process. American Diplomacy And The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967; Brookings Institution/University of California Press  2001.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Ibid.
  6. "U.S. threatened sanctions if Israel blocked 'Roadmap'," World Tribune.com, May 28, 2003
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Ibid.
  11. Ibid.
  12. Ibid.
  13. Ibid.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Ibid.
  17.  Mark R. Levin, “The Vietnamization of the Bush Doctrine.  Where the war on terror stops short, “ National Review Online, April 4, 2002.
  18. “Bush Again Supports Palestinian State,” Arutz Sheva Israel Broadcasting Network, October 12, 2001.
  19. John Donnelly, “US Says Foe’s Defenses Shattered Nation set to push Sharon on agreement,” The Boston Globe, October 10, 2001.
  20.  A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, April 30, 2003. Retrieved April 30, 2003, from  http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm

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